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WHY THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION RESISTS
RADICAL TRANSFORMATION OF
THE CONSTITUTION*
Gary C. Leedes**
I. THE ATTACK UPON A CONSERVATIVE CONSTITUTION
In explaining the Declaration of Independence, Thomas Jefferson
stated that he did not intend to cite "new principles, or new argu-
ments, never before thought of."' The conservative2 Founding Fa-
thers were not dreamers proposing a "new and theoretical system, not
backed up by centuries of experience." 3 They did not seek to trans-
form the world economically or politically; their objective was to re-
store personal liberties "within a context of communal stability.'' 4
Such a view found ready acceptance because Americans in the
colonies were used to a rule-centered legal system that changed slowly
and incrementally.5 The common law, a stabilizing force, facilitated
capitalism and expressed ethical beliefs about good and proper order
among practical, right-minded men. The idea of unchanging princi-
ple, or "natural law was rooted deep in the minds of those Puritan
communities who had fled from England.. . in order to escape royal
despotism." 6
Communal stability was undermined during the 17th century,
when "professional administrators," who were vested with extremely
broad discretionary powers, 7 ignored the theoretical "contractual re-
* Reprinted in RESTORING THE CONSTITUTION: ESSAYS IN CELEBRATION OF THE
BICENTENNIAL (1987).
** Professor of Law, University of Richmond Law School; LL.B., Temple Law School,
1962; LL.M., Harvard Law School, 1972; S.J.D., Harvard Law School, 1983.
1. C. BECKER, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: A STUDY IN THE HISTORY OF
POLITICAL IDEAS 25 (1942) (citing 7 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 304 (ed. 1869)).
2. C. ROSSITER, THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: PART
THREE OF SEEDTIME OF THE REPUBLIC 42-43, 229-30 (1963).
3. P. MILLER, THE LEGAL MIND IN AMERICA: FROM INDEPENDENCE TO THE CIVIL
WAR 20 (1969) (quoting Nathanial Chipman).
4. C. ROssITER, supra note 2, at 230.
5. Bryson, Legal Growth Through Evolution: Comment on the Puritan Revolution and
English Law, 18 VAL. U.L. REV. 643, 649 (1984).
6. A. SOBOUL, THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 1787-1799: FROM THE STORMING OF THE
BASTILLE TO NAPOLEON 6 (1974).
7. T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 42 (1956).
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lationship between ruler and subject." 8 The guarantees of the com-
mon law9 became more secure after Sir Francis Bacon, who defended
the royal prerogative, was impeached in 1621 at the behest of Parlia-
ment.' ° Thereafter, the English monarchs were forced to share their
sovereign power with the representatives of increasing classes of peo-
ple. Crudely put, the sovereign's jurisdiction was limited.
The next few decades saw tremendous upheaval in England's sys-
tem of rule. In 1641, Parliament presented the king with a Grand
Remonstrance reciting many grievances," but his refusal to compro-
mise made civil war inevitable. Charles I was beheaded in 1649.
During most of the interregnum, representative government was inef-
fectual, but the Restoration of 1660 revitalized and increased Parlia-
ment's political clout. 12 Charles II learned to manage Parliament
rather than to engage in imprudent political opposition. However, his
successor, James II, united the propertied class against him' 3 after his
obstinacy and his autocratic methods ensured his downfall.
In the Glorious Revolution of 1688, a combination of Whigs and
Tories, the latter previously loyal to the monarchy, succeeded in driv-
ing James II from England,' 4 and replacing him with William and
Mary.' 5 The powers of William and Mary were limited by a Bill of
Rights, 16 and judges were assured of their "office[s] during good beha-
viour at fixed salaries. ,"'' Subsequently, the "divine right of
kings," formerly an accepted justification for dictatorial rule, became
a discredited political theory.
In view of the preceding historical survey one may understand
the influence of John Locke on the colonists. He had justified the
Glorious Revolution on the basis of natural law, and his political the-
ory, although abstract and unspecific, is clearly a contractarian theory
8. Id. at 42.
9. The common law system of adjudication was viewed as a method for impartial judg-
ment, and a bulwark against any sovereign whose exertions of power did not rest on the sus-
taining support of either society or law.
10. The story of the impeachment is well told in C.D. BOWEN, FRANCIS BACON: THE
TEMPER OF A MAN (1963).
11. C. HILL, THE CENTURY OF REVOLUTION 125 (1961).
12. Id. at 225.
13. Id. at 235.
14. As John Locke wrote, if the government violates the trust reposed in it by society,
power reverts back to society.
15. Benedict, To Secure These Rights: Rights, Democracy, and Judicial Review in the Al-
glo-American Constitutional Heritage, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 69, 79 (1981).
16. Id. at 79, 82.
17. T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 7, at 61. The Act of Settlement of 1701 did not become
effective until the death of Queen Anne in 1714. Bryson, supra note 5, at 645-46.
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with religious roots. 8 "In his [Locke's] thought every individual con-
veys to society as a whole his right of executing the law of nature; all
other natural rights he retains."' 9 John Locke's argument, carried to
its logical extreme, posits a right of revolution against a king or a
Parliament.20  Americans exercised this natural right in 1776.
More generally, Americans drew their ideas about natural rights
from the confluence of three main streams of thought.21 The political
ideas were largely those of the Puritan Revolution (although there
were several different republican conceptions that comprised Puritan
political thought).2 The legal justification was drawn largely from
the "seventeenth-century contests between the English courts and the
crown." 23 Moreover, some of the Founders were influenced by some
Enlightenment thinking-that which was not too radical for the rela-
tively conservative American land-owners and merchants to accept.24
Although the Founders claimed the natural rights were based on
principles of higher law, the rights recognized by courts in America
were often based on reasonable inferences drawn from customs, tradi-
18. D. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 54-55 (1986). Some critics of
natural law allege that it is a "disguise or vehicle for expressions of ecclesiastical faith." J.
FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 25 (1986).
19. T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 7, at 63.
20. Corwin, The "Higher Law" Background of American Constitutional Law, 42 HARV.
L. REV. 149, 389-90 (1928).
21. American leaders had immersed themselves in the literature of politics and govern-
ment. Their understanding of the great works of earlier ages-even the Roman and Attic
classicists, to name a few: Cicero, Herodotus, Thucydides, Polybius and Plutarch-was influ-
enced by their Christian world view of natural law. The Hebraic and Christian traditions were
very much alive. All political thinkers assumed the existence and applicability of the "Laws of
Nature and of Nature's God." What emerged from this study was an amalgam of thoughts as
the Puritans' social contract conceptions competed with many other republican political ideas,
all of which had roots in the liberating ideas of the Reformation, the writings of John Calvin,
Samuel Rutherford, and the English libertarians, Algernon Sidney, Coke, Lord Bolingbroke,
Thomas Gordon, John Trenchard, and James Harrington among others. Missing from the list
of English authorities-respected in America-were the Levellers and Diggers who were far
too radical for the conservative Americans.
22. The republican conceptions of James Harrington are emphasized, updated, and sum-
marized by Professor Frank Michaelman, who reviewed the recent literature that emphasizes
somewhat egalitarian conceptions of republican ideals that are said to prefigure the Marxist
critique of abstract legal rights. See Michaelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term-Foreword:
Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4, 36-49 (1986). Forrest McDonald makes
some important distinctions between puritanical republicanism, which emphasizes morality,
an agrarian variety of puritanical republicanism that emphasized socio-political arrangements,
and oppositionist ideology, which was rooted in the writings of the 17th century com-
monwealthmen, especially Harrington and Sydney. F. McDONALD, Novus ORDO
SECLORUM 70-96 (1985).
23. R. POUND, THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES OF LIBERTY
102 (1956).
24. Few Americans, if any, wanted to destroy the existing social order.
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tions, and legal precedent-unlike the visionaries among the French
revolutionaries who, generally, stressed philosophical abstractions
and speculation. 25 The Founders tried to understand the relation-
ships between the particular laws of their states and the permanently
relevant principles. The Founders were also practical; they did not
confuse liberty with license. They believed that the "decay of a peo-
ple's morals signaled the end of liberty and happiness."26
Though the Founders were devoted to liberty, the Articles of
Confederation failed to prevent state legislatures from impairing
vested property rights and liberties. The weakness of the national
government and the ineffectual checks on faction-ridden state legisla-
tures undermined the reasonable expectations of citizens, who felt be-
trayed. The problem of limiting the powers of majorities without
making the government too weak to perform its duties was solved, to
the greatest degree practicable, by the allocations of power in the
United States Constitution.
So then, "[t]he idea of a written constitution [did] not arise in a
historical and cultural vacuum."27 To understand the Founders' con-
ception of its purposes, "legal interpreters must take seriously the
contractarian moral idea.., for the republican ideals and concepts of
the abortive Puritan Revolution, which never took root in Britain,
received in America a remarkable opportunity of self-conscious polit-
ical elaboration. '28  More specifically, Americans recognized that
civic virtue is the character trait that makes a large nation's popula-
tion qualified to engage in the experiment of self-government.
A nation founded on the proposition that the members of the
political community are directed by a sense of right and wrong needs
coercive laws to punish individuals whose actions are deemed morally
obnoxious. Laws imply "a normative direction to citizens. "29 J.S.
Mill's idea that the government should not regulate morality and
should not punish perpetrators of "victimless" crimes was not accept-
able to the Founders whose notions of the common good were fused
with their notions of civic virtue.
Even though they desired law to secure and maintain civic virtue,
the Founders were prudent enough to delegate power in fragments,
and not all sovereign powers were surrendered by the people. Limited
25. A. SOBOUL, supra note 6, at 5-7.
26. C. ROSSITER, supra note 2, at 200.
27. D. RICHARDS, supra note 18, at 54.
28. Id. at 55.
29. J. FiNNIS, supra note 18, at 283.
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powers were granted to the national government, but the police pow-
ers were reserved for the states. However, the limits and scope of the
police powers and the precise definitions of the people's rights and
duties are not always apparent in the Constitution.30 Obviously, the
Constitution is an outline, not a self-executing law; interpretation is
required. Even this statement, however, has to be qualified since the
document does not directly address every legal question presented to
a court.31
The current debate over the proper method for interpreting the
Constitution heats up when radicals argue with each other and with
conservatives over reserved rights, fundamental rights, and the
Court's method of identifying these rights. What is the nature of a
right? Which rights are reserved? Which ones are fundamental?
And how does a court of law answer these questions?
Although many answers are possible, conservatives believe that
judges-duty bound to obey the law-should use legal reasoning to
maintain the system's continuity, equilibrium, and coherence. Unfor-
tunately, however, a new generation of radical critics are engaged in
the "politics of ... disrupting whatever understandings happen to be
settled."32 The radicals' contempt for the concept of consistently ap-
plied stable law has affected the courts by changing the judges' per-
ception of their role.
Harvard Law School Professor Duncan Kennedy, who advocates
a reconceptualization of the Constitution, writes, "I see myself as a
focus of political energy for change in an egalitarian, communitarian,
decentralized, democratic socialist direction. . .. "" This fuzzy ap-
proach is not rule guided. Kennedy is admittedly willing to ignore
legal constraints, manipulate precedent, distort facts, and juggle prin-
ciples in order to further his social agenda.34 Basically Kennedy de-
scribes the model judge as an existentialist whose role is to alter the
law as rapidly as he can-after he decides how it should be manipu-
lated or rewritten in accordance with Kennedy's socialistic world
view.
The radicals' vision of social justice is often contemptuous of
30. The Framers' intent has to be pieced together from pamphlets, newspaper articles,
broadsides, almanacs, sermons, orations, and numerous other sources.
31. J. FINNIS, supra note 18, at 275-76.
32. Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies: An Introduction to its Origins and Underpinnings, 36
J. LEGAL EDUC. 505, 515 (1986).
33. Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical Phenomenology, 36 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 518, 521 (1986).
34. Id.
1987-88]
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American traditions that place a high value on the free enterprise sys-
tem, the integrity of the family, the sanctity of life, and the rule of
law. Their politics of disruption is intentionally causing confusion.
Four Supreme Court Justices, perhaps confused by the plethora of
commentaries published by these radicals, nihilists, and neo-Marxists,
signed a dissenting opinion suggesting the exercise of police power
must be "morally neutral."35 Many conservatives, therefore, recog-
nize an urgent need to restore, as the nation's basic norm, the written
Constitution, as illuminated by the Founders' known intentions. On
the other hand, radical scholars, who lack coherent theories of consti-
tutional interpretation, regard the Framers' intent as a mystifying ele-
ment that is used by the ruling class to preserve an unjust, oppressive
regime. 36
II. A PLASTIC CONSTITUTION
"This Constitution ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land;
and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstand-
ing."37 So begins the second paragraph of article VI of the United
States Constitution.
If judges differ with the imperatives of the written Constitution,
they may not, as Duncan Kennedy otherwise contends, "go quite un-
hesitatingly for a 'nonlegal' approach."3 " Quite the contrary: article
VI, clause 3 provides that all members of the legislature and all execu-
tive and judicial officers including those of the United States Supreme
Court "shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Consti-
tution. ' 39 The Framers were aware that the Constitution and "the
Rule of Law [do] not guarantee every aspect of the common good,"'
but each judge has the duty "of 'ensuring the unbroken continuance
of law' " as he preserves the tradition of the legal idea captured by the
text.41
During the ratification process, the Constitution's opponents
were apprehensive about the uncertain breadth of the Constitution;
they were particularly concerned about the powers delegated to the
35. Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2855 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See
infra Section VI.
36. See Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57, 74-75 (1984).
37. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
38. Kennedy, supra note 33, at 528.
39. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3.
40. J. FINNIS, supra note 18, at 274.
41. H. GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 292 (1975).
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national government, including the federal courts.42 Their worst fears
have been realized. Federal courts in the twentieth century often cite
the due process concept to transform the meaning of text allocating
powers to Congress and the state legislatures. In modem parlance,
"due process of law" refers not merely to procedural regularities, as it
did in the 18th century; the due process clauses now have the poten-
tial to nullify laws that foster community morality and civic virtue.
By linguistic sleight of hand, a judge who is intellectually com-
mitted to values other than the supremacy of the Constitution can
improperly reconstruct, beyond recognition, the intended meaning of
the written Constitution.43 The Founders were forewarned that the
"discretion of a Judge ... is the law of tyrants; it is always unknown,
different in different men; it ... depends on ... temper [and] passion
.... "44 On the other hand, James Madison, who at first opposed a
Bill of Rights, later agreed that it puts a " 'legal check ... into the
hands of the judiciary' " which can be used by judges to secure an
individual's rights.45 Despite the ambivalence of some, and the mis-
givings of others, article III describes a judicial power that, as inter-
preted by judges, has made the Supreme Court "the most
extraordinarily powerful court of law the world has ever known."'46
An early example of judicial power occurred in 1803 when, in
Marbury v. Madison,47 the Court held that an act of Congress was
repugnant to article III, section 2 of the Constitution. Furthermore,
in dicta, later endorsed by specific holdings, the Court asserted its
power to issue decrees that require the obedience of the President of
the United States.48 Chief Justice John Marshall, in Marbury, had to
explain why the Supreme Court, and not the legislature or the chief
executive, had the final word in cases involving interpretation of the
Constitution. Marshall explained that the oath requires judges to de-
cide cases according to the text's genuine meaning. His explanation is
somewhat circular, but the Court's assertion that it is empowered by
42. G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC: 1776-1787, 540 (1969).
43. There is a measure of truth in Lord Bacon's maxim: "That is the best law, which
trusts the least to the discretion of a Judge, and he is the best Judge, who trusts least to
himself." W. PHILLIPS, REVIEW OF LYSANDER SPOONER'S ESSAY ON THE UNCONSTITU-
TIONALITY OF SLAVERY 17 (reprint 1969).
44. Id.
45. G. WOOD, supra note 42, at 543.
46. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR
OF THE NATION 1 (2d ed. 1986).
47. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
48. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
1987-88)
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article III to perform a checking function comports with the separa-
tion of powers doctrine-so long as judges act as impartial arbiters.
We expect judges to reduce general legal principles to the size
required by the concrete case before the court without putting a parti-
san spin on the relevant legal materials. The Constitution itself fos-
ters this view by providing that federal judges "shall hold their Offices
during good Behaviour."49 The art of judging takes skill, but inter-
pretations of the Constitution, according to Marshall, are merely by-
products of case by case adjudication. 50 Like the common law, the
body of case law that interprets the Constitution grows by means of
incremental modifications that do not transmute foundational norms.
Of course, a reader's understanding of the written text is altered
when the relevant legal principles are applied in unprecedented cir-
cumstances. In hard cases, drawing out the latent meaning of the text
is not a prohibited method of interpretation. Indeed the public ex-
pects the judge to be responsible for "the ... renewal of a coherent
body of principled rules."51 If however, the judge intentionally mis-
construes the intended meaning of the text, the judge violates the
"good Behaviour" requirement of article III.
Radical critics of our legal system urge judicial courts to "work
toward a genuine reconstruction of society."52 Their idea of social
justice, however, is a concept broader than formal justice.5 3 Indeed,
social justice is a generality that carries the judge to a stratospheric
level of abstraction. Radicals manipulate this abstraction in ways
designed to reconstitute conventional morality. In the service of so-
cial justice, Kennedy advocates an approach that encourages partisan
judges to treat the Constitution like plastic which can be bent out of
shape in order to subvert the Founders' original understandings.54
This innovative professor alleges that respected methods of adjudica-
tion are unrealistic and outmoded because they perpetuate a corrupt
and oppressive status quo.55 Radicals like Kennedy allege that the
49. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
50. Alexander Hamilton had written earlier that the judiciary "may truly be said to have
neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment." THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 504 (A.
Hamilton) (Modem Library ed. 1937).
51. A. BICKEL, supra note 46, at 25.
52. Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of Norma-
tive Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063, 1109 (1981).
53. W. FRANKENA, The Concept of Social Justice, in SOCIAL JUSTICE 2 (R. Brandt ed.
1962).
54. Kennedy, supra note 33, at 526.
55. To be sure, the techniques employed routinely in the judicial process introduce a cer-
tain narrowness of perspective that impedes court induced change, but the Founders and Chief
[Vol. 10:275282
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power structure is "an instrument of the de facto ruling class" that
exploits politically and economically powerless groups.5 6
Ultimately these same radicals who promote social justice offer
their "muddled views and proposals"57 as a substitute for existing
constitutional rules. Therefore, conscientious jurists, both liberals
and conservatives, have correctly described the radicals' notions of
justice and fairness as "intellectually incoherent and morally
bankrupt."58
III. THE RULE OF LAW VIRTUES
A judge cannot decide a hard case, which falls between the gaps
in the law, merely by studying law books.59 Moreover, certain ineffa-
ble norms guide the interpreter who tries to discern what is left unsaid
by a text. Therefore, the "logical" techniques of exclusion, subsump-
tion, derogation, and non-contradiction are not sufficient for hard
cases. 61 In short, legal science has not developed surefire syllogisms
that completely eliminate discretion.6'
Certain techniques intrinsic to the art of judging work reasonably
well to prevent judicial runaways from taking the law into their own
Justice Marshall believed that needed social reforms were primarily the responsibility of the
people's representatives, not courts. Normally, Marshall's Court did not interfere with the
legislatures' functions. On the other hand, if state action clearly violated the basic law, his
Court stood firm.
56. E. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS 259 (1975).
57. Schwartz, With Gun and Camera Through Darkest CLS-Land, 36 STAN. L. REV.
413, 454 (1984).
58. Kronman, The Problem of Judicial Discretion, 36 J. LEGAL EDUc. 481, 484 (1986).
59. Some judicial discretion is inevitable because the extent to which an established princi-
ple governs the pending case depends not only on the selection and characterization of the
relevant facts, the nature of the relief sought by the plaintiff, and the number of conflicting
rules involved, but also on the nature and weight of the principle in question.
60. For an accessible introduction, see Paulson, Book Review, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 802
(1981) (reviewing HARRIS, LAW AND LEGAL SCIENCE (1979)).
61. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., a dominant figure in American jurisprudence, criticized
the "fallacy of the logical form," which was a mode of legal reasoning suggesting that every
narrow case ruling is fore-ordained by a preexisting rule and that there were no gaps in the
law. Taken to a silly extreme, this view implies that syllogistic logic dictates each case ruling
regardless of the absurd consequences that would follow. Holmes argued that deductive logic
does not always suffice for those trying to predict the outcome of a case. But Holmes was not
an opponent of generalization or of the deductive method or of a predictable legal system. He
was not motivated by any irrational contempt for logical inference. He did believe that it was
necessary for the judge to maintain continuity with the past, and he could not abide judges
who injected their own political agenda into the development of constitutional law. See gener-
ally, M. WHITE, SOCIAL THOUGHT IN AMERICA: THE REVOLT AGAINST FORMALISM 15-18,
59-75 (1976).
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hands.62 Many canons of judicial restraint are designed to encourage
the judge to defer to the judgments made by politically accountable
officials. These include the following: the doctrine of clear mistake;
the canon that cases should not be decided on constitutional grounds
when other grounds upon which to base the decision are present; the
doctrine of abstention, which requires a court to decline the exercise
of jurisdiction; and the political question doctrine, which requires to-
tal deference if no judicially manageable legal standards exist.
Although these prudential standards involve a range of discretionary
options, they reduce opportunities for judges to impose unacceptable
radical change.
Other constraints, called "rule of law virtues, '6 3 structure the
case law. For example, a court has the "argumentative burden"64 to
justify its departure from precedent. Normally, like cases should be
decided alike65 unless the judge can conscientiously justify the differ-
ent result by citing an overriding reason that outweighs the require-
ments of formal justice.66
Although it is difficult to determine which cases are "alike," 67
judges frequently conceal the difficulty. 68 But the judge who makes a
habit of manipulating precedent loses the confidence of the legal pro-
fession. Indeed, a court is severely criticized if it has two inconsistent
lines of cases because lawyers cannot properly advise their clients if
the likely outcome of adjudication is unpredictable. In short, courts
are expected to make decisions that do not frustrate retroactively the
reasonable expectations of persons who rely on the legal system to
protect their established rights.69
Justice would be delayed if the judge had to re-invent the wheel
62. See K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION (1960). Although Karl Llew-
ellyn was once a leader of the so-called skeptical school of American legal realists, even he
believed courts do employ a responsible, intelligible method of decision making. Conversely,
he believed that judges may not ignore the assumed purpose of a constitutional provision or a
statute by manipulating the techniques of adjudication and interpretation in order to decide
cases as they please. Id. at 374.
63. Moore, A Natural Law Theory ofInterpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 277, 313 (1985).
64. Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 587 (1987).
65. Moore, supra note 63, at 316.
66. "When a judge decides a case he does so not as a single individual standing in olym-
pian isolation, but as a member of a professional community which is itself the bearer of a
specific intellectual and moral tradition." Kronman, supra note 58, at 483.
67. Schauer, supra note 64, at 596.
68. Duncan Kennedy demonstrates how judges can manipulate precedent to make the
case at hand seem analogous both to precedent and the judge's vision of the Good Society. See
Kennedy, supra note 33.
69. See generally, G. LEEDES, THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION (1986).
[Vol. 10:275
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each time a routine case is filed. The demand for efficient judicial
administration puts pressure on the judge to "let what has been set-
tled remain so."' Therefore, stare decisis stabilizes the law.
At the same time legalistic rigidity, regardless of consequences,
obviously is not a rule of law virtue. Judges are not foreover locked
into the maintenance of a destabilizing line of cases. Therefore, in the
truly exceptional case, deviation from previous decisions is sometimes
condoned. For example, if the Supreme Court departs from prece-
dent and overrules Roe v. Wade,7 the Justices should be able to de-
scribe how Roe makes it practically impossible for legislatures to
control abortion on demand. Moreover, the Court will have no diffi-
culty explaining how the overruling of Roe v. Wade restores the Con-
stitution's original meaning.
On the other hand, the relatively infrequent "hard case" should
not become the foundation for a radical theory of law. Judges unduly
preoccupied by consequentialist considerations ultimately undermine
and destroy rights.72 Excessive use of ad hoc balancing tests is fatal to
the concept of law. 73 Although some norms of justice require aban-
donment of rule of law virtues in particular cases, the reasonable
judge makes the effort to integrate the novel case ruling into the net-
work of constitutional law.
Extremists, who are looking to circumvent law,7 4 often decide
cases according to the contra-constitutional formula of Duncan Ken-
nedy whose model judge follows this approach:
As I work to manipulate the [relevant legal materials] .. .in
the direction of ... [the way I want the case to be decided], I have
a strong feeling that I am acting in the world, remaking it to fit my
intentions. If I manage to restate the law so that it plausibly re-
quires my preferred outcome, I will see this as my
accomplishment.75
In other words, Kennedy's nonlegal approach is designed to permit
courts to use the law as an instrument to further the judge's secret
political agenda.
Some judges have apparently decided that the creeds of Euro-
pean philosophers are superior to the "parochial" or "bourgeois" or
70. Moore, supra note 63, at 318.
71. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
72. C. FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 8-9 (1978).
73. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 24-27 (1971).
74. Roe v. Wade is a classic example of this practice.
75. Kennedy, supra note 33, at 557.
1987-88]
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"hypocritical" vision of the Framers. 6 The judge often claims that he
cannot accurately discern the Framers' intent. This palliative argu-
ment is preposterous when, for example, Immanuel Kant is the
judge's guru. Kant, who died in 1804, wrote his "Critique of Pure
Reason" before the Constitution was ratified. Yet an opinion based
on Kant's categorical imperative, or his vision of human dignity, im-
plies that the judge has the ability to understand and elaborate upon
Kant, but not James Madison.
If a judge does not understand the ideas of justice cherished by
the Founders, he probably lacks the intellectual ability to understand
the ideas of justice implicit in Kant's moral philosophy. A judge, who
is not a professional philosopher specializing in Kant, will depend on
commentaries by post-Hegelian idealists, phenomenologists, or decon-
structionists. This dependence brings into play semiotics, semiology,
Levi-Strauss's modernistic structuralism, and the deconstructionist
critiques of Derrida and other post-modernists. Having gone this far,
the judge will need to decide whether the hermeneutic perspective of
either Jiirgen Habermas, Paul Ricoeur, or Hans Gadamer captures
the process of genuine interpretation. On the other hand, the reason-
able judge who adheres to the rules of law and the Founders' intent
will not get lost in the wilderness of historicism, cultural relativism,
dialectical reasoning, linguistic theory, and bunk.
If the judge is reasonably intelligent, he will be able to discern the
meaning of the text in the routine case. When the meaning is unclear,
a textual leap of faith is unnecessary because the Framers' general
intent is usually illuminating. The Framers' intent is still an impor-
tant reference point for contemporary judges. In Marshall's words,
the Constitution's "provisions are neither to be restricted into insig-
nificance, nor extended to objects not comprehended in them, nor
contemplated by its framers."77
The Founders, it cannot be gainsaid, professed the importance of
rule of law virtues that constrain judicial discretion. The problems
presented by the threat of judicial tyranny have not disappeared, and
have been the subject of the great debate over the failed nomination of
Judge Robert H. Bork.
76. See, e.g., Brennan, Constitutional Adjudication and the Death Penalty: A View From
the Court, 100 HARV. L. REV. 313, 323-24 (1986).
77. W. PHILLIPS, supra note 43, at 36 (quoting Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.)
213, 332 (1827)).
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IV. THE GREAT DEBATE
A. Methods of Constitutional Interpretation
"There is probably more debate today than ever before about the
duties of judges, and indeed about the freedom of judges, in deciding
constitutional cases." 78 The majority of theoretical law review arti-
cles "assign to judges not the task of defining values found in the Con-
stitution but the task of creating new values and hence new rights for
individuals against the majority."79  Many scholars urge judges to
use-as sources of law-materials not found within the four corners
of the Constitution.
Some reliance on non-textual sources of law is inevitable when
judges determine which rights are inchoate in the Constitution. On
the other hand, Judge Robert H. Bork writes,
Where constitutional materials do not clearly specify the value to
be preferred, there is no principled way to prefer any claimed
human value to any other. The judge must stick close to the text
and the history, and their fair implications, and not construct new
rights ....
... [W]here the Constitution does not embody the moral or
ethical choice, the judge has no basis other than his own values
upon which to set aside the community judgment embodied in the
statute. That, by definition, is an inadequate basis for judicial
supremacy.80
Academic specialists in constitutional law reply that "the origi-
nal meaning of the document as drafted by the founders is unknow-
able or irrelevant and that constitutional decision-making should be
based on a judge's understanding of certain fundamental principles of
moral philosophy."'" Moreover, they assert that the Founders real-
ized that their ideas of justice were primitive; supposedly they
designed a living constitution, which adapts to changed perceptions of
justice. The Court is singled out as the engine of change when legisla-
tive majorities fall short of the academics' ideal republic.
Critics of traditional jurisprudence further allege that constitu-
78. Bork, Styles in Constitutional Theory, 26 S. TEx. L.J. 383 (1985).
79. Id. at 384.
80. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 8, 10
(1971).
81. THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY, THE GREAT DEBATE: INTERPRETING OUR WRITTEN
CONSTITUTION (1986) (containing speeches by Attorney General Edwin Meese III, Justice
William J. Brennan, Jr., Justice John Paul Stevens, Judge Robert H. Bork, and President Ron-
aid Reagan) [hereinafter THE GREAT DEBATE].
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tionalists like Bork cannot demonstrate that their approach furthers a
legitimate scheme of human association.8 2 The formal method of
legal analysis required by the rule of law virtues are said to explode
"into too many contradictory implications." 3 A radical Harvard law
professor, Roberto Unger, is developing "a program for the recon-
struction of the state and the rest of the large-scale institutional struc-
ture of society" 84 as a new jurisprudence designed to replace the
formal methods. The question remains whether judges should be in
the vanguard of a radical political movement. John Ely points out
that the judiciary is no better, and may be worse, than the more politi-
cally accountable officials in giving expression to emerging ideas of
progress.8 5 Ely also points out that in a pluralistic nation, few, if any,
shared values are shared except at the highest levels of generality. 6
David A. J. Richards, an anti-Bork law professor who holds a
doctorate in philosophy, demurs, stating that "it does not follow that
because there exists disagreement about how the premises apply in
concrete cases, these disagreements may not be reasonably adjudi-
cated."8 7 Richards, however, has not yet demonstrated why these
questions should be decided in court rather than by the political pro-
cess. It is blowing smoke to suggest that results produced by the
courts are unjust when Richard's dynamic standard of justice is based
on his self-conscious reflection on past republican experiments and
theories, which he has synthesized with inferences drawn from the
collected works of Kant, Rousseau, J.S. Mill, and John Rawls. 8  The
question presented by Richard's thesis is whether judges are equipped
to fathom, master, and apply the meld of ideas produced by his aca-
demic approach to government.
The law schools do not train lawyers and judges to be moral phi-
82. See generally R. UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT, 4 passim
(1986).
83. Id. at 7.
84. Id. at 25. For Unger, the "good" realization of human nature is understood in the
historical "spiral of increasing community and diminishing domination." R. UNGER,
KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 238-39 (1975). Unger is not a skeptic; in fact, he is a rationalist
"[who] is developing a neo-Aristotelian theory ... which grounds the notions of truth and the
good in human nature and the historical process of human development." Stick, Can Nihilism
Be Pragmatic?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 332, 337 n.17 (1986).
85. See generally, J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL RE-
VIEW (1980).
86. Ely, The Supreme Court, 1977 Term-Forward. On Discovering Fundamental Values,
92 HARV. L. REV. 5, 28-31, 45 (1978).
87. Richards, Moral Philosophy and the Search for Fundamental Values in Constitutional
Law, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 319, 321 (1981).
88. RICHARDS, supra note 18, at 57-58.
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losophers, and studies disclose very clearly that the "judges' attitudes
on important social and political issues do not reflect those of the pop-
ulation at large."8 9 This last fact should be a cause for concern in a
nation where the people are sovereign and the officials are public ser-
vants.9" But Richards regards the majority's understanding of many
traditional American values, such as disapproval of homosexual activ-
ity, as intolerant and immoral "forms of prejudice that treats persons
not as persons but as stereotypes ... that... degrade moral personal-
ity."9' His theory presupposes that judges, when compared to the vot-
ers, have the intellectual acumen and honesty to acquire the capacity
for "cultivating self-reflective argument, in assessing conflicting views,
and in this way. . . [can] cultivat[e] a more encompassing and flexible
moral impartiality."92 Indeed, Richards believes that judges have a
unique opportunity to reconstruct the Framers' intent in ways that
"may best define the community's sense of what its traditions now
mean or should mean."93 Nihilists make a different argument when
they call for "opportunistic judicial authoritarianism."94 They do not
believe in shared values, or in shared standards of rationality.95 Many
scholarly nihilists view the indeterminateness of the Constitution's
due process clauses as opportunities that can further their unconven-
tional social theories which reflect their hatred of traditional values.
These scholars are not constrained by principles shaped by English
and American history. Other professors, who are not nihilists, but are
enamored with insights drawn from the works of philosophy, say
"history is what we make of it."96
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has succumbed to this think-
ing. The Constitution, I submit, is often merely invoked by the Court
as a cover to justify results reached on other grounds. To the extent
judicial activism or judicial restraint-in the service of the judge's
own political agenda-is making the entire legal system incoherent,
the judges are unwittingly giving credence to the radicals' critique of
law.
The Solicitor General of the United States, Charles Fried, him-
self a former professor, is vexed by the "notion that legal rules and
89. Brest, Who Decides?, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 661, 669 (1985).
90. Id.
91. Richards, supra note 87, at 319.
92. Id. at 327.
93. Richards, Interpretation and Historiography, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 490, 499, (1985).
94. Bork, Styles in Constitutional Theory, 26 S. TEX. L.J. 383, 388 (1985).
95. But see Stick supra note 84, passim.
96. Schauer, The Role of the People in First Amendment Theory, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 761
(1986).
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doctrines cannot control particular cases or even coerce our judgment
and that such rules are a sham, merely invoked after the fact to justify
[case rulings] reached on other grounds."'9 7  Indeed, many other
judges and scholars do not buy into the relativistic nightmare that the
Constitution's meaning is in the eye of the beholder--especially if the
"progressive" beholder does not respect the Founders' ideas of justice.
In July of 1985, Attorney General Meese vigorously joined the
debate, which reached fever pitch during the confirmation hearings of
Judge Robert Bork. The Attorney General urged the Court to adopt,
and be guided by, a "jurisprudence of original intention." This con-
ception was immediately attacked by some notables who used lan-
guage bordering on the contemptuous. None other than Supreme
Court Justice William Brennan defensively declared that Meese's call
for a return to a more traditional jurisprudence was simply "arro-
gance cloaked as humility. '9 8 Justice Brennan received support from
Justice Stevens who also ridiculed the idea that Supreme Court jus-
tices were constrained by the Constitution's text and the Founders'
original intentions. 99
B. The Position of Attorney General Edwin Meese III
Attorney General Meese does not believe judges should twist the
Constitution as if it were clay in a potter's hands. In the first of sev-
eral controversial speeches, he stated,
The judges, the Founders believed, would not fail to regard the
Constitution as "fundamental law" and would 'regulate their de-
cisions" by it. As the "faithful guardians of the Constitution," the
judges were expected to resist any political effort to depart from
the literal provisions of the Constitution. The text of the document
and the original intention of those who framed it would be the judi-
cial standard in giving effect to the Constitution.'°°
Meese alleges that the Court is producing a "jurisprudence of idiosyn-
cracy.. .,' 0' which is "neither simply liberal nor simply conservative;
neither simply activist nor simply restrained; neither simply princi-
pled nor simply partisan.' 0 2 Instead, the Court's cases disclose that
97. Fried, Sonnet LXVand the "Black Ink" of the Framers'Intention, 100 HARV. L. REV.
751, 754 (1987).
98. THE GREAT DEBATE, supra note 81, at v.
99. Id. at 27-30.
100. THE GREAT DEBATE, supra note 81, at 1.
101. Id. at 3.
102. Id.
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undisciplined justices "continued to roam at large."'' 3 His critique
singled out three important areas of law: federalism, criminal proce-
dure, and religious freedom.
Concerning federalism, the Court has made a shambles of the
tenth amendment's reservation of powers for the states. Meese cites
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,"° which gives
Congress the green light when federal lawmakers want to impair the
ability of states to perform significant, legitimate functions. In Garcia
the Court refused to invalidate a law that interferes with the ability of
local government to structure and operate public services. But the
Framers did not want the states to be mere puppets of the national
government. Federalists and antifederalists alike assumed that most
governmental functions would be performed by the states."°5 Yet
Meese demonstrates that the Court displayed "a disregard for the
Framers' intention that state and local governments be a buffer
against the centralizing tendencies of the national Leviathan."10 6
Since the Constitution was ratified under the belief, sedulously
propagated on all sides, that the tenth amendment should prevent un-
warranted centralization, Garcia departs "from long-settled constitu-
tional values."' 0 7 The Court has given Congress a blank check that, if
cashed, can obliterate the independence of fifty states. Although Gar-
cia is couched in the language of judicial restraint, the Court's deci-
sion has the effect, as intended, of reallocating political power, and
that power is now placed within the confines of the D.C. Beltway.
The Court knows full well what the Framers intended. But the Court
has abdicated its previously asserted jurisdiction to maintain the bal-
ance between rival claims of the states and the Congress.
The Court also goes to the other extreme and resorts to unprinci-
pled judicial activism as a means to interfere with orderly state gov-
ernment. The primary responsibility for administering criminal
justice rested with the state courts until the Supreme Court reallo-
cated power by devising a doctrine of selective incorporation. For
example, the Court insists that the fourteenth amendment incorpo-
rates guarantees secured by some provisions of the first, fourth, fifth,
sixth, eighth, and ninth amendments.'0 8
103. Id.
104. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
105. A. E. Dick Howard, The Constitution: Mirror of National Life, U.S. News and World
Report, Dec. 29, 1986, at 22.
106. THE GREAT DEBATE, supra note 81, at 3.
107. 469 U.S. at 561 (Powell, J., dissenting).
108. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring)
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As a result, many obviously guilty criminals have the upper hand
in state court prosecutions. For example, reliable evidence indicating
guilt is excluded if acquired in a search by officers who should know
they are violating the fourth amendment's prohibition of warrantless
or unreasonable searches. The Court has imposed the same strict
standards on the local constable which the fourth amendment im-
poses on the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Obviously, "[p]olice
officers cannot apprehend the enemies of society while carrying [the
Supreme Court's case reports] in one hand and the Emily Post's latest
edition on Etiquette in the other."'' 9 Unlike F.B.I. agents, the Local
constabulary is not adequately staffed with trained lawyers who know
the technicalities which make the fourth amendment a difficult subject
to master. Thus, the criminal often goes free when the constable
blunders. "o Although the Court has dramatically reduced the exclu-
sionary rule's scope in recent years, the doctrine of selective incorpo-
ration has dealt a "politically violent and constitutionally suspect"
blow to the principle of federalism which is a basic underpinning of
the Constitution.11'
Justice Brennan's separate opinion in Ohio ex rel. Eaton v.
Price "2 "set forth what came to be the doctrinal foundation of the
Warren Court's criminal procedure revolution.""' This doctrine,
simply put, is that the Court selects certain guarantees that are said to
be "in" the fourteenth amendment, while it rejects others that are said
to be "out." Curiously, the Court has never disclosed the rationale
behind its selectivity. Judge Henry Friendly, who was more sensitive
to the values of federalism, noted with typical understatement that "it
does seem extraordinary that a theory going to the very nature of our
Constitution and having such profound effects for all of us should be
carrying the day without ever having been explicated in a majority
opinion of the Court."'"1
4
Another commentator notes that "however handy or beneficial
the 'selective incorporation' theory has been as an instrument of legal
(ninth amendment); BARRETT & COHEN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
518-19 (7th ed. 1985) (summary of selective incorporation cases involving first, fourth, fifth.
sixth, and eighth amendments).
109. Commonwealth. v. Chaitt, 176 Pa. Super. 318, 334, 107 A.2d 214, 223 (1954).
110. People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926) (Cardozo, J.).
111. THE GREAT DEBATE, supra note 81, at 8.
112. 364 U.S. 263, 274-76 (1960) (per curiam) (separate opinion of Brennan, J.).
113. Israel, Selective Incorporation: Revisited, 71 GEO. L.J. 253 (1982).
114. Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 929,
934 (1965).
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change, there seems to be no clear constitutional rationale for it."' 5
Indeed, Justice Harlan stated that the doctrine of selective incorpora-
tion championed by the Court has no coherent constitutional founda-
tion. 16 Professor Henkin, after a careful study of the Framers' intent,
notes that "[s]elective incorporation finds no support in the language
of the [fourteenth] amendment, or in the history of its adoption.""17
Professor Lino A. Graglia is more blunt:
[C]onstitutional law has became a fraud, a cover for a system of
government by the majority vote of a nine-person committee of
lawyers, unelected and holding office for life. The desirability of
this form of government should be the central question in any real-
istic discussion of judicial review today." 8
Equally disturbing are cases dealing with the religion clauses of
the Constitution. On this subject, Meese criticized Wallace v. Jaf-
free 119 by noting that an Alabama statute "failed to pass muster"'' 20
because it violated the establishment clause of the first amendment.
Indeed, Alabama was prevented from authorizing a moment of si-
lence for "meditation" or "voluntary prayer" after the Court con-
cluded that the state intended to reintroduce and endorse prayers into
the public schools.
The historical data relied on by the Court in the decision in-
cluded a hotly contested interpretation of a letter written by Thomas
Jefferson. Jefferson's letter notwithstanding, the Founders who be-
lieved in religious toleration did not intend to build a wall of separa-
tion that exalts secularism to the point where states cannot
accommodate those who want a moment of silence during which all
those compelled to attend classes may, if they choose, pray quietly to-
gether. Dissenting Justice Rehnquist stated, "It is impossible to build
sound constitutional doctrine upon a mistaken understanding of con-
stitutional history."' 12' As the present Chief Justice also wrote,
"There is simply no historical foundation for the proposition that the
115. F. GRAHAM, THE SELF-INFLICTED WOUND 44 (1970).
116. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 174-76 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Pointer v.
Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 409 (1965) (Harlan J., concurring). See also L. LuSKY, BY WHAT
RIGHT? 163 (1975); Henkin, "Selective Incorporation"in the Fourteenth Amendment, 73 YALE
L.J. 74, 77 (1963).
117. Henkin, supra note 116, at 77.
118. Graglia, Judicial Review on the Basis of "Regime Principles": A Prescription for Gov-
ernment by Judges, 26 S. TEx. L.J. 435, 441 (1985).
119. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
120. THE GREAT DEBATE, supra note 81, at 7.
121. 472 U.S. at 92 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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Framers intended to build the 'wall of separation,' "122 which requires
state and local governments to be neutral in political contests between
religion and irreligion. 123
Meese believes it is "bizarre" for the state to stay neutral in cases
involving prayer in public facilities. 124 He writes that the first amend-
ment's religion clauses function "to prohibit religious tyranny, not to
undermine religion generally."' 125 His views are consistent with those
of the Founders according to Robert L. Cord who finds no evidence
indicating that the establishment clause limited the states' powers to
deal with separation of church and state issues. 126 Nevertheless, the
doctrine of selective incorporation enables the Court to use the estab-
lishment clause as a limit on state power. Thus, once again, the
Court's selectively inconsistent judicial activism threatens to make
mush of the Framers' core values.
Wallace v. Jaffree is applauded by the professors who do not re-
spect the authoritativeness of the original understanding. Indeed,
Professor Perry argues that the original understanding of the text is
no longer authoritative. 127 He states, however, that the Framers' in-
tention can be cited to disguise a judicial decision based on moral
philosophy. Perry's views, to the extent that they are covertly
adopted by the Court, enable the Justices to change the meaning of
the establishment clause. Yet since radical change is the political ob-
jective of those total secularists who "believe that constitutional inter-
pretation [by judges] must express a free response to contemporary
conditions, mores, and temperaments,"' 128 the Framers' intent is cited
selectively and fraudulently.
Meese believes that a conscientious attempt to restore candor is
necessary. He respects John Marshall's admonition that "the Consti-
tution is a limitation on judicial power as well as executive and legisla-
tive."' 129 Any other notion of judging is "totally at odds with the logic
of our Constitution and its commitment to the rule of law."' 30 He
scolds judges who substitute elastic words for the words of the Consti-
122. Id. at 106.
123. Id. at 98.
124. THE GREAT DEBATE, supra note 81, at 9.
125. Id.
126. R. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 15 (1982).
127. Perry, The Authority of Text, Tradition, and Reason: A Theory of Constitutional "In-
terpretation," 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 551, 570 (1985).
128. Fried, supra note 97, at 755. Solicitor General Fried was criticizing this school of
thought.
129. THE GREAT DEBATE, supra note 81, at 10.
130. Id.
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tution. Similarly, Justice Black wrote, "One of the most effective
ways of diluting or expanding a constitutionally guaranteed right is to
substitute for the crucial word or words of a constitutional guarantee
another word or words, more or less flexible and more or less re-
stricted in meaning. "131
It is unusual for the Justices to respond to criticisms by making
speeches and writing articles that serve to defend their decisions.
Meese's criticisms of the Court, however, jarred Justice Brennan,
who has tried to rally political support for his revisionary and elasti-
cized interpretations of the Constitution.
C. Justice Brennan's Response
Taking the offensive against Attorney General Meese, Justice
Brennan states,
There are those who find legitimacy in fidelity to what they
call "the intentions of the Framers." In most doctrinaire incarna-
tion, this view demands that Justices discern exactly what the
Framers thought about the question under consideration and simply
follow that intention in resolving the case before them. It is a view
that feigns self-effacing deference to the specific judgments of those
who forged our original social compact. But in truth it is little
more than arrogance cloaked as humility. It is arrogant to pretend
that from our vantage we can gauge accurately the intent of the
Framers on application of principle to specific, contemporary
questions. 132
The Attorney General, of course, never said that the justices
have a duty to discern "exactly" what the Framers thought about the
specific questions of law presented in hard cases, and he knows better
than to suggest that Justices who are not trained historians "can
gauge accurately the intent of the Framers" '33 in every case. Meese
knows that the customs and practices of those living during the ratifi-
cation process are useful guides for discerning the concerns that may
be ascribed to the Founders. Indeed, the concerns which made
amendments to the Constitution necessary limit the scope of the gen-
eral principles that may be ascribed to the Framers.
One need not be a trained historian, for example, to realize that
the concerns that led to the fourteenth amendment do not encompass
131. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 509 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting).
132. THE GREAT DEBATE, supra note 81, at 14 (emphasis added).
133. Id.
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a right to abortion on demand.'3 4 The fourteenth amendment reads
in part, "No state shall . . .deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law."' 13 5 Obviously, the idea of ra-
cial equality, which led to the fourteenth amendment, does not justify
a case ruling 3 6 that authorizes one and one half million abortions a
year.
Yet Justice Brennan offers the following excuse for many of the
Court's decisions:
All too often, sources of potential enlightenment such as records of
the ratification debates provide sparse or ambiguous evidence of
the original intention. Typically, all that can be gleaned is that the
Framers themselves did not agree about the application or mean-
ing of particular constitutional provisions, and hid their differences
in cloaks of generality. Indeed, it is far from clear whose intention
is relevant-that of the drafters, the congressional disputants, or
the ratifiers in the states. 137
With all due respect, the problem of figuring out what all the relevant
actors generally intended is not difficult when the question is whether
the due process clause requires the invalidation of rational laws that
are designed to protect the potential of human life.
Alexander Bickel was a scholar who carefully studied the origi-
nal understanding of those who debated the scope of the fourteenth
amendment. 3 ' Although Bickel himself believed that history rarely
gives specific answers to specific present problems,1 39 he did not be-
lieve that history could be ignored when it shed light on a specific
issue before the Court. He wrote, "The Court is to reason, not feel, to
explain and justify principles it pronounces to the last possible ra-
tional decimal point. It may not itself generate values, out of the
stomach, but must seek to relate them-at least analogically-to
judgments of history and moral philosophy."'" Bickel, whose review
of the historical record of the fourteenth amendment was relied on by
the Court in Brown v. Board of Education, thought it "astonishing"' 14 1
134. In Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians, 106 S. Ct. 2169 (1986), Chief
Justice Burger, referring to the Court's opinion, noted that it undermines the rejection of "the
idea of abortion on demand." Id. at 2190.
135. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
136. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
137. THE GREAT DEBATE, supra note 81, at 14-15.
138. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARv. L. REV. 1
(1955).
139. A. BICKEL, supra note 46, at 102.
140. A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 26 (1975).
141. Id. at 28.
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that only two Justices dissented from the Court's abortion rights deci-
sion in Roe v. Wade. 1
42
I suspect that Justice Brennan himself knows that the Framers of
the fourteenth amendment did not share all his ideas of justice, which
is why he adopts this fallback position: "Those who would restrict
claims of right to the values of 1789 [or 1868] specifically articulated
in the Constitution turn a blind eye to social progress and eschew
adaptation of overarching principles to changes of social
circumstance."1
43
Any argument that judges have a superior vision of social pro-
gress "seems to labor under an extremely unrealistic, rose-colored
view."' 4 4 Professor Graglia has nothing but contempt for Justice
Brennan's idea of the Court's competence, role, and function.
[U]nder those judicial robes there are only lawyers, not persons
selected for the job because of unusual depth or breadth of learn-
ing, or exceptional ethical, political, or historical insight .... [Flar
from necessarily possessing expertise in any substantive area of
human knowledge, our judges typically rejected post-graduate edu-
cation in favor of going to law school. The study and practice of
law has many advantages, including the acquisition of great skill in
the manipulation of words, but few would recommend it as a
means of inculcating habits of ethical fastidiousness or devotion to
candor. No person knowledgable as to the making of lawyers or
the practice of law can possibly believe that it is from among law-
yers that we should select our ethical leaders or that to the lawyers
selected we may safely grant governmental authority with no re-
striction other than they are to apply traditional standards of
rights, political and ethical norms. "'
Aside from Graglia's plausible skepticism about the ability of lawyers
to resolve the pressing social issue of the day on the basis of moral
philosophy, popular sovereignty-absent provisions in the Constitu-
tion to the contrary-authorizes majority rule.
Justice Brennan, however, states, "Faith in democracy is one
thing, blind faith quite another."'' 46 This statement, although true, is
misleading. For example, it is hard to believe that the Framers of the
ninth, tenth, or fourteenth amendments 47 intended to protect a ho-
142. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
143. THE GREAT DEBATE, supra note 81, at 15.
144. Graglia, supra note 118, at 446.
145. Id. at 446-47.
146. THE GREAT DEBATE, supra note 81, at 16.
147. U.S. CONST. amends. IX, X, XIV.
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mosexual's act of sodomy.
Nevertheless, Justice Brennan, who opposes laws prohibiting ho-
mosexual sodomy,"' insists:
Each generation has the choice to overrule or add to the funda-
mental principles enunciated by the ... Framers....
[T]he ultimate question must be, what do the words of the text
mean in our time. For the genius of the Constitution rests not in
any static meaning it might have had in a world that is dead and
gone, but in current problems and current needs. What the consti-
tutional fundamentals meant to the wisdom of other times cannot
be their measure to the vision of our time.'4 9
The homosexual issue is just an example of Justice Brennan's
penchant for reading his own personal values into the Constitution.
The Framers of the Bill of Rights were alert to the dangers of such
excessive emphasis upon rights in general. The Federalist asserts that
" 'liberty may be endangered by the abuses of liberty, as well as by the
abuses of power.' "15o Yet Justice Brennan writes, side-stepping the
admonition, "Our Constitution was not intended to preserve a preex-
isting society but to make a new one, to put in place new principles
that the prior political community had not sufficiently recognized."' 51
Human dignity is a concept that has, in the abstract, the alle-
giance of nearly everybody, but Justice Brennan manipulates this con-
cept to invent new rights. He admits that his conception of human
dignity is the product of an "evolution of our concepts,"' 52 adding:
I do not mean to suggest that we have in the last quarter century
achieved a comprehensive definition of the constitutional ideal of
human dignity. We are still striving toward that goal, and doubt-
less it will be an eternal quest. For if the interaction of [myself]
and the constitutional text over the years confirms any single prop-
osition, it is that the demands of human dignity will never cease to
evolve. 153
Brennan insists that "we [the Court] are the last word on the meaning
of the Constitution [that embodies my vision of evolving dignity]."' 54
148. Justice Brennan joined in the dissenting opinions of Justices Blackmun and Stevens in
Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2848-59 (1986). The dissenters would have invalidated a
Georgia Law criminalizing sodomy. Id.
149. THE GREAT DEBATE, supra note 81, at 17.
150. Clor, Judicial Statesmanship and Constitutional Interpretation, 26 S. TEX. L.J. 397,
424 (1985) (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 63, at 423 (J. Madison) (P. Ford ed. 1898)).
151. THE GREAT DEBATE, supra note 81, at 18.
152. Id. at 19.
153. Id. at 23.
154. Id. at 24.
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In a recent lecture, he explained how his vision of evolving
human dignity justifies his view that capital punishment is cruel and
unusual, and thus prohibited by the eighth and fourteenth amend-
ments.'11 He concedes that in 1971, "I was the only one [of the Jus-
tices] who had come to believe that capital punishment was under all
circumstances prohibited by the eighth amendment."'' 56 He has now
convinced other justices to believe that "[t]he most vile murder does
not . . . release the State from constitutional restraints on the destruc-
tion of human dignity."'
' 57
Justice Brennan knows that the Framers of the eighth amend-
ment "did not regard capital punishment as impermissible, because it
was common practice at the time the Bill of Rights was ratified."' 1
8
Moreover, the fifth amendment specifically contemplates "capital...
crime[s]" and the taking of life. 1 59 Nevertheless, the Justice argues-
as if he actually knows the Framers' subjective mental state-that the
Framers deliberately used the words "cruel and unusual punishment"
to allow for a "progressive interpretation.' 60 In his words, although
the standard "cruel and unusual" remains the same, "its applicability
must change as the basic mores of society change. ",161 One problem
with Justice Brennan's argument is that he has not produced evidence
indicating that the basic mores of society have changed. His argu-
ment boils down to this: I have a better understanding than those who
disagree with me about basic societal mores because the public's
evolving standards of human dignity have been retarded by outmoded
traditions. Yet he frequently claims that he does not advocate amend-
ment of the Constitution "by judicial fiat, guided by reference to little
more than [my] own personal views."' 162
Perhaps Justice Brennan thinks he has cultivated civilized in-
sights which eliminate the desire for retribution after a vile murder,
but he has not successfully explained how his insights are consistent
with the traditions and conscience of the American people-in 1791,
in 1868, or in 1987. Yet this is the Justice who declares time and
again that Attorney General Meese is arrogant because he advocates a
jurisprudence of original intentions.
155. Brennan, Constitutional Adjudication and the Death Penalty. A View from the Court,
100 HARV. L. REV. 313 (1986).
156. Id. at 321.
157. THE GREAT DEBATE, supra note 81, at 24.
158. Brennan, supra note 155, at 323-24.
159. U.S. CONST. amend V.
160. Brennan, supra note 155, at 326.
161. Id. at 327 (emphasis in original).
162. Id. at 320.
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Until Brennan explains more cogently how the nation's evolving
standards of human dignity have changed, unbeknownst to most of
the state legislatures, courts, and Supreme Court Justices, his view
will continue to appear eccentric. On the other hand, because he has
been remarkably successful convincing some of his colleagues that he
has the better reasoned argument, he has helped make the Supreme
Court a top-priority national concern.
D. The Attorney General's Reply
Attorney General Meese, replying to Justice Brennan's claim
that the Framers' intent is dimmed by the mists of time, explained
that "[t]he period surrounding the creation of the Constitution is not
a... mythical realm. The young America of the 1780's and 90's was
• . . alive with pamphlets, newspapers, and books chronicling and
commenting upon the great issues of the day."' 1 63 In short, "One can
talk intelligently about a founding generation . . . [and] [t]heir inten-
tion was to write a document not just for their times but for
posterity.""16
Meese concedes that the "Constitution is not a legislative code
bound to the time in which it was written. Neither, however, is it a
mirror that simply reflects the thoughts and ideas of those who stand
before it.' 16 Therefore, while the Framers knew they could not pre-
dict how all foreseeable disputes would be resolved under the Consti-
tution, they made its meaning clear enough that, with some effort, it
can be known. 166 Meese writes,
James Madison said, if "the sense in which the Constitution was
accepted and ratified by the nation . . . be not the guide in ex-
pounding it, there can be no security for a consistent and stable
government .... " Jefferson was even more explicit in his personal
correspondence. [He wrote]: "On every question of construction
[we should] carry ourselves back to the time, when the constitution
was adopted; recollect the spirit manifested in the debates; and in-
stead of trying [to find], what meaning may be squeezed out of the
text, or invented against it, conform to the probable one, in which
it was passed."' 167
Madison opposed the tendency of the judge who thinks he is an "inge-
nious theorist" who designs "a Constitution planned in his closet or in
163. THE GREAT DEBATE, supra note 81, at 31-33.
164. Id. at 33.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 34.
167. Id. at 36.
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his imagination."' 68 Yet that is what many judges are doing-urged
on by radicals who do not respect the rule of preexisting law.
Henry Monaghan, trying to hold back the radical tide, stresses
the following points: (1) original intent is "a way of thinking about
constitutional 'meaning' that follows from the basic concepts" that
make judicial review a legitimate undertaking for courts, and (2)
many of those scholars and judges who oppose restricting judges to
the text and Framers' intent view those restrictions as an impediment
to their political goals. 169 Monaghan has Professor Michael Perry in
mind as an example. Perry writes, that "in the end the answers the
Court gives are (most often) its own, and not the framers'. And that
is as it should be: the framers, after all, were not gods, but, like us,
merely human beings." 17 As an antidote to this call for freewheeling
jurisprudence, Meese cites Chief Justice John Marshall who wrote
that "the 'principles' of the Constitution 'are deemed fundamental
and permanent,' and, except for formal amendment,
'unchangeable.' ",171
V. THE PHILOSOPHER KINGS
Justice Brennan frequently takes the law into his own hands
when he is convinced that his vision of human dignity is superior to
previously decided precedent. The professors who support Justice
Brennan's artificially accelerated social change are opposed to the At-
torney General's rule-centered jurisprudence, which places limits on
judicial innovation. These scholars have little political clout, but their
law review articles often influence the direction of the law.
A widely acclaimed article 172 written by Paul Brest summarizes
the views of several influential authors who are regularly cited in
Supreme Court opinions. Brest, however, does not pose as simply a
disinterested commentator above the fray; he openly uses his analysis
to advocate "a genuine reconstitution of society"' 173 by courts.
Brest comments on the Supreme Court cases that recognize un-
precedented rights of privacy. In Griswold v. Connecticut,'74 for ex-
ample, the Court held that married couples may use contraceptives in
168. THE FEDERALIST No. 37, at 231 (J. Madison) (Mod. Libr. ed. 1937).
169. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 375-79 (1981).
170. M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 75 (1982).
171. THE GREAT DEBATE, supra note 81, at 39-40.
172. Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of Norma-
tive Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063 (1981).
173. Id. at 1109.
174. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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the privacy of their own bedroom, notwithstanding a statutory prohi-
bition. The right generally identified in Griswold was marital privacy,
but in Eisenstadt v. Baird 175 the Court held that the fundamental
right of contraceptive measures identified in Griswold is not limited to
married couples: The Court's opinion proclaimed "the right of the
individual, married or single, to. .. [decide] whether to bear or beget
a child."'
176
The Eisenstadt dictum about the right to bear and beget a child
was covertly planted 77 in order to fabricate a woman's "right" to
choose whether or not to have an abortion. 7 8 Recently, in Thorn-
burgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists,'79 the
Court-for all practical purposes-made abortion on demand a fun-
damental right. After Thornburgh, if a pregnant woman finds a pro-
choice physician (or a pro-choice "family planning" agency finds one
for her), the physician may perform an abortion, even during the
third trimester. In my opinion, Thornburgh opens the door for post-
viability abortions, notwithstanding state law to the contrary, when-
ever the physician believes that a late pregnancy will increase medical
risks that endanger the patient's physical, psychological, or emotional
health. Medical risks include any transient anxiety caused by the
prospect of an unwanted child, and the physician's judgment is final.
The state thus may not influence medical judgment in abortion cases.
The Court subsequently resolved an allegedly related issue:
whether the Constitution provides persons with a fundamental right
to have intimate associations-a euphemism for the right of a homo-
sexual to engage in consensual sodomy. By a narrow one vote mar-
gin, the Court upheld the Georgia statute that prohibited sodomy. 180
Justice Blackmun, the author of Roe v. Wade, trying to use law as a
medium for social change, supported the homosexual's claim that
Georgia's law "involves an unconstitutional intrusion into his privacy
and his right of intimate association."' 181
The Court's category of nonconstitutional privacy rights is evi-
dently open ended. Brest writes,
The judges and scholars who support judicial intervention usually
175. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
176. Id. at 453.
177. B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN 175-76 (1979).
178. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
179. 106 S. Ct. 2169 (1986).
180. Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986).
181. Id. at 2849 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan, along with Justice Marshall
and Stevens, joined in Justice Blackmun's dissenting opinion.
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acknowledge that the rights at stake-variously described in terms
of privacy, procreational choice, sexual autonomy, lifestyle
choices, and intimate association-are not specified by the text or
original history of the Constitution. They argue that the judiciary
is nonetheless authorized, if not duty-bound, to protect individuals
against government interference with these rights, which can be
discovered in conventional morality or derived through the methods
of philosophy and adjudication.' 8 2
Professor Brest cites the works of Alexander Bickel who sug-
gested that judges have a unique opportunity to protect values not
written explicitly into the text of the Constitution. Bickel wrote,
Judges have, or should have, the leisure, the training, and the insu-
lation to follow the ways of the scholar in pursuing the ends of
government. This is crucial in sorting out the enduring values of a
society....
• ..[Courts can] appeal to men's better natures, to call forth
their aspirations, which may have been forgotten in the moment's
hue and cry ... "'
Scholars who take an expansive view of the Court's ability to identify
fundamental rights think that Bickel relied too much on tradition and
enduring principles. They agree that Bickel pointed them in the right
direction, but did not go far enough."8 4 However, Bickel made it clear
that the Court's identification of rights "must rest on fundamental
presuppositions rooted in history to which widespread acceptance
may fairly be attributed." '185 Moreover, the judge's idea of progress
must not be one foreclosed by the Constitution.
Although Professor Brest criticizes Bickel for his tentativeness,
some of Bickel's ideas are intellectually powerful premises for a more
radical theory of social transformation. But Bickel's own ambivalent
philosophy of law was influenced by Justices Brandeis, Cardozo,
Frankfurter, and Harlan. These judges, some politically liberal and
some conservative, were not existentialists; they were constrained by
the Constitution's limitations and the cake of custom. They admitted,
of course, that the Court had the responsibility of rendering judg-
ments when a litigant claimed his rights were violated. But they did
so with trepidation because neither they, nor Bickel, ever successfully
182. Brest, supra note 172, at 1064 (emphasis added).
183. Brest, supra note 172 at 1066 (quoting A. BICKEL, supra note 46, at 25-26) (emphasis
added)).
184. D. RICHARDS, supra note 18, at 11.
185. A. BICKEL, supra note 46, at 236 (quoting with approval, Sweezy v. New Hampshire,
354 U.S. 234, 276 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
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identified reliable, objective sources of law from which an extraconsti-
tutional judgment was to be drawn.' 86
Bickel respected jurists who were committed to the rule of law
and the premises of popular sovereignty. He did not respect jurists
who invented a "rights theory" that was deduced solely from abstrac-
tions like human dignity or equal concern and respect-abstractions
that generate radical changes. The judges that Bickel admired did not
pretend that they developed a superior theory of moral progress. For
example, Justice Harlan did not look kindly upon the law challenged
in Griswold, which prohibited the use of contraceptives by married
couples. But he concurred in the Griswold Court's judgment presum-
ably because the challenged statute unquestionably interfered with a
relationship traditionally fostered by most states.187 Griswold opened
the door for the fusion of morality with law.
Brest's article discusses the work of Professor Harry Wellington
who writes, "Judicial reasoning ... must be concerned with conven-
tional morality, for it is there that society's set of moral principles and
ideals are located." '188 To discern society's conventional morality,
judges should "become sensitive to it, experience widely, read exten-
sively, and ruminate, reflect, and analyze situations that seem to call
moral obligations into play."'' 8 9 Wellington believes that the Court
has the ability to convert a principle of conventional morality into "a
legal one by connecting it with the body of constitutional law."' 90
Wellington believes societal consensus supports the Court's deci-
sion protecting marital privacy in the bedroom. However, he argues
that conventional morality does not condone sexual intercourse
among unmarried couples. Moreover, he does not think that abor-
tions on demand are constitutionally protected. Brest therefore con-
cludes that Wellington's "source of values for constitutional
adjudication is conventional morality elucidated by intuitionistic
reasoning." '191
Other scholars who rely on consensus theories reach different re-
sults than Wellington. Many jurists, like Justice Brennan, have no
problem in finding a consensus that supports the abolition of capital
186. A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 34 (1978).
187. Griswold, 381 U.S. 479, 499 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring). See Poe v. Ullman, 367
U.S. 497, 553-54 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
188. Brest, supra note 172, at 1068 (quoting Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitu-
tional Double Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221, 244 (1973)).
189. Id. at 1069 (quoting Wellington, supra note 188, at 246).
190. Id. at 1070 (quoting Wellington, supra note 188, at 284).
191. Id. at 1071.
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punishment, even though most of the states have laws providing for
the death penalty. In short, consensus-based rationalizations can be
improperly used by delinquent judges to manipulate the law. This
risk is intolerable to interpretivists, like Judge Bork, but the radicals,
instead of criticizing manipulation, make use of this shabby technique
in order to undermine traditional values.
Professor Michael Perry condones far more judicial activism
than Wellington. Perry's dream court invokes "society's moral ide-
als" even if an enduring consensus has not developed.192 Thus Perry
believes the abortion case was easy and correctly decided. He also
thinks many laws prohibiting homosexual sodomy are
unconstitutional. 193
In many privacy cases involving sexual conduct, Perry maintains
that the Constitution's text does not rule out "any answer a majority
of the Court is likely to want to give. '"194 Therefore, a judge may
speculate about the aspirations of contemporary Americans, without
regard for America's tradition and any enduring consensus.195 He
argues that judicial activism need not wait on the American people,
but that it can "stimulate, provoke, and participate in the polity's in-
cessant search for a better way of living."'' 9
6
Perry dismisses traditional conceptions of democratic theory be-
cause the text does not indicate which conceptions are axiomatic. He
explains ingeniously that the areas of politics controlled by majorities
depend on the Court's interpretations of the Constitution, as illumi-
nated by the best philosophical opinions.' 97 His favorite philosophers
are not those who find the Burkean tradition resonant. Perry's own
dialectical mode of thought gives little weight to the Framer's intent.
After all, they are dead.
Perry dismisses arguments based on separation of powers con-
straints as just another variation of the argument based on the Fram-
ers' intent and democratic theory.' 98 Therefore, an activist Court has
a free hand to decide whether its decisions violate limits imposed by a
separation of powers doctrine. In other words, if the anachronistic
192. Id. at 1072 (citing Perry, Substantive Due Process Revisited: Reflections on (and Be-
yond) Recent Cases, 71 Nw. U. L. REV. 417, 431-32 (1977)).
193. Perry, supra note 192, at 449.
194. Perry, The Authority of Text, Tradition, and Reason: A Theory of Constitutional "In-
terpretation, " 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 551, 568 (1985).
195. Id. at 570-71.
196. Id. at 575.
197. Id. at 576.
198. Id. at 586-87.
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separation of powers technicality interferes with the Court's quest for
more moral progress than legislatures can bear, the Court should act
as the prophets of old and condemn the backsliding. In a nutshell,
Perry believes that the judge's own informed conscience and the Con-
stitution are virtually congruent normative constraints.
Perry does not say why anyone who disagrees with the Court's
conscientious aspirations would feel morally obligated to obey its de-
crees. In Judge Bork's words, "Not only is moral philosophy wholly
inadequate to the task [of interpreting the Constitution] ... there is no
reason for the rest of us, who have our own moral visions, to be gov-
erned by the judge's moral predilections."' 99
Perry admits, "Political-moral philosophy ... is in a state of
serious disarray .. .[owing to] competing conceptions of justice." 2"
He also admits that "we must understand better than we do the na-
ture of the . ..ways in which we use the past to transcend the
past."' 20 ' Apparently, when Perry's dream court feels it has a better
understanding of moral philosophy, communities will have it forced
upon them.
Brest takes notice of Professor's Karst's argument that a homo-
sexual relationship, however promiscuous, is a constitutionally pro-
tected right because casual encounters may "ripen into durable
intimate associations."202 Karst defines his proposed freedom of inti-
mate association as "a close and familiar personal relationship with
another that is in some significant way comparable to a marriage or
family relationship. '20 3 He stresses the importance of the "emotions"
generated by the "core associational value of intimacy.- 20 4
Karst believes homosexuals are peculiarly affected adversely by
the majority's malevolent attitudes towards oral and anal sex. 20 5 He
insists "that the sovereign must keep its hands off an individual's asso-
ciational choice ... [because] moral responsibility lives in the only
place it can live, the individual conscience.9 20 6  Karst, therefore,
equates the protection of the Constitution with the lowest common
denominator of autonomy, the sexual activities of a person who has
199. THE GREAT DEBATE, supra note 81, at 45.
200. Perry, supra note 194, at 593.
201. Id. at 596.
202. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 633 (1980).
203. Brest, supra note 172, at 1073 (citing Karst, supra note 202, at 629).
204. Karst, supra note 202 at 635. "Intimate relationships of homosexual women and men
include oral sex as a primary option, and, for homosexual men, anal sex as well." D. RICH-
ARDS, supra note 18, at 271.
205. Karst, supra note 202, at 685.
206. Id. at 692.
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found a like-minded partner. His apologetics for casual sex obviously
have had an impact on the Court; his article was cited with approving
admiration by the dissenters in Bowers v. Hardwick.2 °7
Although society's official condemnation of homosexual sodomy
is unjustly severe when twenty year jail sentences are meted out by
juries,2 °8 four Justices assert that the Court may force the legislature
to condone homosexual acts that are judged reprehensible by the elec-
torate.2 °9 Clearly Judge Bork agrees that judges should rely on the
moral judgments of the electorate rather than on their own intuitions,
or Kenneth Karst's.
Brest discusses Judge Bork's adherence to the Framers' intent as
a constraint on judicial review-finding it lacking in cogency, and not
demonstrably required by the Constitution. 210 Bork writes, "Society
consents to be ruled undemocratically within defined areas by certain
enduring principles believed to be stated in, and placed beyond the
reach of majorities by, the Constitution. ' 21 '1 Brest, however, is quick
to point out that the Founders do not help us decide whether the
peoples' consent refers to their acquiescence to the entire system of
government, or the system of activist judicial review that Bork finds
objectionable.212
Judge Bork argues, correctly I submit, that "any defensible the-
ory of constitutional interpretation must demonstrate that it has the
capacity to control judges. '213 Judge Bork believes that the social
contract is honored by courts only "if the judges interpret the docu-
ment's words according to the intentions of those who drafted, pro-
posed, and ratified its provisions." '2 14 Bork thinks a judge should
reach his legal conclusion after he finishes his initial task of finding
from the text, structure, and history of the Constitution a premise
that "states a core value that the framers intended to protect. ' 21 5 The
first amendment, for example, plainly protects freedom of speech, but
its guarantees can be fixed at various levels of abstraction. Bork uses
the Framers' general intent as an important source of law to deter-
mine whether obscenity is among the core values protected by the
207. 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2854 (1986).
208. Id. at 2847 (Powell, J., concurring).
209. Id. at 2848-59.
210. Brest, supra note 172, at 1090-92, 1096-97, 1101-02.
211. Id. at 101 (citing Bork, supra note 80, at 3).
212. Id. at 1102.
213. THE GREAT DEBATE, supra note 81, at 45.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 46.
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concept of speech.21 6
Bork also uses the Framer's intent, among other legal materials,
to justify Brown v. Board of Education.21 7 He writes,
[O]ne thing the Court does know [about the intentions of the
Framers of the fourteenth amendment]: It [the equal protection
clause] was intended to enforce the core idea of black equality
against government discrimination. And the Court, because it
must be neutral, cannot ... write the detailed code the Framers
omitted, requiring equality in this case but not in another. The
Court must, for that reason, choose a general principle of equality
that applies to all cases.2'8
The general principle of equality for racial minorities, previously en-
slaved, can be cited by courts as one among many justifications for
eliminating state-mandated segregation in public schools-a specific
problem not addressed by the Framers.
Brest notes that Bork has not sufficiently eliminated judicial dis-
cretion because judges make arbitrary choices among optional levels
of generality. For example, Brest asks whether the fourteenth amend-
ment demands equality for blacks, "or a broader principle of 'racial
equality' . . . or is it a still broader principle of equality that encom-
passes discrimination on the basis of gender (or sexual orientation) as
well?' 21 9  Bork's answer helps solve the hermeneutic problem. He
writes,
Obviously, values and principles can be stated at different levels of
abstraction. In stating the value that is to be much protected, the
judge must not state it with so much generality that he transforms
it. When that happens the judge improperly deprives the demo-
cratic majority of its freedom [to choose which laws govern their
community]....
I think that is wrong and that an intentionalist can do what
Brest says he cannot. Let me use Brest's example .... Assume for
the sake of argument that a judge's study of the evidence shows
that both black and general racial equality were clearly intended,
216. Bork, supra note 80, at 20-35. Professor Richards, however, finds "this historical ap-
peal to Puritan understanding unacceptable." D. RICHARDS, supra note 18, at 205. Richard's
study of moral philosophy leads him to conclude that the first amendment protects obscenity.
"Its point is that the dignity of a free people cannot yield to the state the issues of conscience
that are each person's inalienable responsibility to defend and vindicate." Id. at 209.
217. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
218. Brest, supra note 172, at 1091 (citing Bork, supra note 80, at 14-15).
219. Id. at 1091.
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but that equality on such matters such as sexual orientation was
not under discussion.
The intentionalist [judge] may conclude that he can enforce
black and racial equality but that he has no guidance at all about
any higher level of generality. He has, therefore, no warrant to
displace a legislative choice that prohibits certain forms of sexual
behavior. That result follows from the principle of acceptance of
democratic choice where the Constitution is silent. In short, the
problem of levels of generality is solved by choosing no level of
generality higher than that which interpretation of the words,
structure, and history of the Constitution fairly support.22 °
Under this method of interpretation, Karst's theory that the equal
protection clause protects intimate associations, including those of
homosexuals, does not wash.
Bork thinks that Griswold was decided incorrectly because,
although Connecticut's law interfered with marital privacy, certain
issues concerning the marital relationship should be resolved by the
people themselves through their duly elected representatives. 221 One
is tempted to quarrel with Bork, because marital privacy is consonant
with traditional American values. It is hard to accept the idea that
the bedroom privacy of married couples is unprotected by the four-
teenth amendment. On the other hand, one must recall how Griswold
opened the door for judicial opportunists who cite it as analogous pre-
cedent, supporting the "fundamental" right of a homosexual to en-
gage in sexual acts with any consenting adult male in his bedroom.
If judges were demonstrably trustworthy enough to supplement
their understanding of legally relevant materials with an elaboration
of enduring values, not readily identifiable in the Constitution's text,
one might welcome prudent judicial activism. For example, the right
of a grandmother to live with her grandchildren was not addressed by
the Framers, yet the Court in a plausible opinion upheld her right to
do so in Moore v. City of East Cleveland.2 22 This traditional freedom
to choose to live with relatives was characterized correctly as a liberty
"deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition.' ' 223 Because
Moore is inconsistent with the views of Attorney General Meese and
Judge Bork, their positions have disadvantages. To understand why
they are willing to endure these disadvantages, it is necessary to dis-
220. THE GREAT DEBATE, supra note 81, at 47-48.
221. Id. at 51.
222. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
223. Id. at 503.
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cuss the dissenting opinions in Bowers v. Hardwick.224
VI. BOWERS v. HARDWICK AND THE SLENDER MORAL
MAJORITY
Michael Hardwick was charged with violating a statute which
penalizes "[a] person [who] commits the offense of sodomy when he
performs or submits to any sexual act involving the sex organs of one
person and the mouth or anus of another." '225 The legal question
presented was whether this restriction "infringes upon the fundamen-
tal constitutional rights of Michael Hardwick." '226
The court of appeals, after observing that certain decisions "are
... beyond the legitimate reach of a civilized society, ' 227 held that
Mr. Hardwick's "quintessentially private" 228 homosexual act is pro-
tected by the Constitution. The appellate court cited Griswold v. Con-
necticut,229 which held that marital privacy is a fundamental right;
but Hardwick obviously could not claim the privacy rights that flow
from a marital relationship.
The lower court also cited Roe v. Wade,23 ° which fully protects a
woman's (including a mature minor's) reproductive autonomy; but
Roe does not address the question of sexual permissiveness. Also
cited, as if analogous, was Meyer v. Nebraska,23' which involved the
LeacLjng of language in public schools, but which also contains dicta
referring to parental rights and other traditionally venerated values.
Moore v. City of East Cleveland232 was also cited-as if a grand-
mother's freedom to live with her grandchildren is a relationship simi-
lar, in kind, to a homosexual relationship. In short, bits and pieces
from various cases, at best tenuously related, were manipulated in or-
der to construct, by means of the fallacy of vicious abstraction, a con-
stitutional right to be sexually aberrant.
Since Hardwick's sexual liaison occurred in his home, the lower
court cited Payton v. New York.233 Under normal circumstances, as
Payton held, police officers may not enter a home to make warrantless
224. 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2848-59 (1986).
225. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1984).
226. Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202, 1211 (1th Cir. 1985).
227. Id.
228. Id at 1212.
229. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
230. 760 F.2d at 1212-13 (citing 410 U.S. 113 (1973)).
231. Id, at 1211 (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)).
232. Id. at 1211, 1212 (citing Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977)).
233. Id. at 1212 (citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980)).
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arrests. Conversely, Payton made it clear that a police officer with a
warrant may legally enter a person's private residence. Since the po-
lice officers who arrested Hardwick complied with the fourth amend-
ment's procedural safeguards, the lower court obfuscated the issue.
The lower court also cited Stanley v. Georgia,"' which held that read-
ing obscene materials at home is a protected first amendment activity.
If carefully read, the Stanley opinion indicates that the state retains its
police power, and may prohibit many criminalized activities (e.g., pri-
vate use of controlled substances) unprotected by the first amendment
wherever they occur.23 5 Nonetheless, the lower court concluded:
[T]he Supreme Court's analysis of the right to privacy in Griswold
v. Connecticut .... Eisenstadt v. Baird,236 ... and Stanley v. Geor-
gia, ... leads us to conclude that the Georgia sodomy statute im-
plicates a fundamental right of Michael Hardwick. The activity he
hopes to engage in [homosexual sodomy] ... lies at the heart of an
intimate association beyond the proper reach of state regulation.
Such a right is protected by the Ninth Amendment ... and the
notion of fundamental fairness embodied in the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.237
The ninth amendment, relied on by the lower court, was ratified
because the antifederalists feared abuses of power by the federal gov-
ernment. It is turning somersaults with history to suggest that the
Founders vested federal courts with the power to invalidate state laws
when local moral judgments do not coincide with the judiciary's vi-
sion of social justice. The Framers did not intend the ninth amend-
ment to be used as if it were an empty can, which judges can fill with
what they personally regard as legislative trash.
The judgment of the lower court was reversed by the slender
margin of one vote. Incredibly, four justices were willing to hold that
homosexual activity is a protected association that is beyond reach of
state regulation.
Justice Blackmun's dissenting opinion endorses a principle of law
so general that it can be manipulated to reach any result pleasing to
him. He argued that this "case is about 'the most comprehensive of
rights and the right most valued by civilized men,' namely, 'the right
234. Id. (citing Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969)).
235. 394 U.S. at 568 (1969).
236. In Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), the Court held that denial of access to
contraceptives to the unmarried violates equal protection of the law. See supra text accompa-
nying notes 175-78.
237. 760 F.2d at 1212.
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to be let alone.' ",238 Instead of explaining the origin and limits of this
general principle, Justice Blackmun resorts to argumentum ad
hominem by writing, "Georgia... must do more than assert that the
choice they have made is an 'abominable crime not fit to be named
among Christians.' "239
Justice Blackmun implies that "traditional Judeo-Christian val-
ues"' 240 are a basis for "religious intolerance" and "prejudice. '24 1 His
reference to religious objections is a red herring. "Decisions of indi-
viduals relating to homosexual conduct have been subject to state in-
tervention throughout the history of Western Civilization. 2 42  The
Founders' lawbooks "described 'the infamous crime against nature' as
an offense of 'deeper malignity' than rape, an . . . act 'the very men-
tion of which is a disgrace to human nature.' ",243
Although Justice Blackmun believes personally that the reasons
for the common law view of homosexual sodomy (e.g., the Founders'
Judeo-Christian world view) have vanished, "and the rule simply per-
sists from blind imitation of the past," 244 his "right to be let alone"
principle does not help the Court distinguish between sodomy and
other potential privacy rights such as incest, bigamy, prostitution, and
adultery.245
Blackmun adopts the position of Karst, whose law review article
alludes to loving, caring, intimate associations,246 but Justice Black-
mun ignores this organizing principle (which does not bridge the gap
between the general "right to be let alone" and the asserted specific
rights of homosexual sodomists). Not bothering to distinguish be-
tween promiscuous and nonpromiscuous homosexuals, the dissenting
justice writes,
The fact that individuals define themselves in a significant way
through their intimate sexual relationships with others suggests, in
a Nation as diverse as ours ... much of the richness of a relation-
238. 106 S. Ct. at 2848. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277
U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
239. Id. (citing Herring v. State, 119 Ga. 709, 721, 46 S.E. 876, 882 (1904)).
240. Id. at 2854.
241. Id. at 2855.
242. Id. at 2847 (Burger, J., concurring).
243. Id. (Burger, J., concurring) (citing 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 215).
244. Id. at 2848 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV.
L. REV. 457, 469 (1897)).
245. Justice White's opinion for the Court noted how difficult it would be, except by arbi-
trary fiat, "to limit the claimed right to homosexual conduct while leaving exposed to prosecu-
tion adultery, incest, and other sexual crimes ... committed in the home." Id. at 2846.
246. Karst, supra note 202, at 632-35.
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ship will come from the freedom an individual has to choose the
form and nature of these intensely personal bonds.247
Citing Karst exemplifies the fallacy of misplaced authority, because
the cases taught by the professor, rather than his critical evaluation,
are authoritative.
Justice Blackmun cannibalizes precedent. For example, he cites
Wisconsin v. Yoder,24 8 which held that the Amish, because of their
sincerely held religious convictions, have a first amendment right to
provide vocational education to their adolescent children at home.
Blackmun equates Yoder with Bowers v. Hardwick because the behav-
ior in both cases appears "odd or even erratic"24 9 to the electorate,
but there are obviously major differences between the Amish and
"gay" communities--differences that are constitutionally signifi-
cant.25 Justice Blackmun sees a "parallel between Loving [v. Vir-
ginia]25" ' and [Bowers]," '2 52 but Loving invalidated a state law
forbidding interracial marriage and, unlike homosexual sodomy, the
freedom to choose a spouse of the opposite sex has "long been recog-
nized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit
of happiness by free men."25 3
Justice Blackmun ignored many precedents on point. The dis-
senters did not distinguish Reynolds v. United States,254 which upheld
a statute outlawing "odious" polygamy.255 For another example, the
Court in Davis v. Beason2 6 recognized that it lacked power to exempt
from criminal law relationships that "tend to destroy the purity of the
marriage relation, to disturb the peace of families, to degrade women
and to debase man. '25 7 The Davis court, although concerned with
protecting an individual's right of conscience, refused to uphold the
decision of a person "cohabiting with more than one woman" 258 be-
cause to do so would "shock the moral judgment of the
247. 106 S. Ct. at 2851 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See also Karst, supra note 202, at 637;
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
248. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
249. 106 S. Ct. at 2852 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
250. Sodomy was "forbidden by the laws of the original thirteen States" when the Bill of
Rights was ratified. Id. at 2844. On the other hand, home education was commonplace.
251. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
252. 106 S. Ct. at 2854 n.5 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
253. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (emphasis added).
254. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
255. Id. at 164.
256. 133 U.S. 333 (1890).
257. Id. at 341.
258. Id. at 347.
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community. "259
Justice Blackmun gives little weight to the moral judgment of the
community; he observes that in sexual relationships, there might be
many "right" choices of intimate sexual activity.26 ° Since he also
thinks that "[r]easonable people may differ about whether particular
sexual acts are moral or immoral,"'261 he should have conceded that
the question is meat for a state legislature. Yet, Justice Blackmun
insists that the legislature must be "morally neutral, '262 which is a
remarkable dilution of the police power. How can an amoral legisla-
ture deal with issues pertaining, for example, to the environment, eco-
nomic justice, euthanasia, or surrogate motherhood? How can a
legislature be morally neutral when the police power, whether exer-
cised or not, requires essentially moral judgments? How can the legis-
lature differentiate between immorality and the common good
without taking a moral position? How can the Court define moral
neutrality without taking a moral position?
Some specialists in constitutional law, who oppose legislation ap-
plied to penalize homosexual behavior, disapprove of this unconven-
tional lifestyle, but do not think it is any of the legislature's business.
They should vote accordingly. Courts should respect the electorates'
essentially moral choice. The dissenting justices distinguish between
immorality that occurs in private and that which occurs in public.
But the legislature is not required to be naive, just because sexual be-
havior, odious to the community, occurs in private. Recruitment does
not begin in the bedroom, it ends up there. Deterrence of indecent
behavior deemed harmful to individuals and the community is a per-
missible governmental purpose.263
Justice Blackmun is hardly morally neutral when he asserts that
Mr. Hardwick exercised a fundamental right that "embodies the
'moral fact that a person belongs to himself and not others nor to
society as a whole.' "264 Although, as Justice Blackmun puts it, a ho-
mosexual "belongs to himself," his actions affect others who might
later regret their decision. The intimate homosexual relationship
259. Id. at 341.
260. Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. at 2851 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
261. Id. at 2855.
262. Id.
263. The fourteenth amendment does not limit the states' reserved powers to prohibit ho-
mosexual sodomy. In fact, when the due process of law clause of the fourteenth amendment
was ratified all but five of the states, obviously not morally neutral, had criminal sodomy laws.
Id. at 2844-45.
264. Id. at 2851 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Thornburgh v. Am. College of Obstetri-
cians & Gynecologists, 106 S. Ct. 2169, 2187 n.5 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
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often interferes with other intimate relationships. For example, mar-
riage and other family relationships are adversely affected by homo-
sexual promiscuity.
Justice Blackmun identifies, but does not describe, legislative
"moral neutrality," and his dissenting opinion suggests that he lacks
insight "to distinguish the moral from the non-moral. 265 Few mod-
ern philosophers do.2 66 Indeed, Justice Blackmun becomes somewhat
tentative when he writes that "the right of an individual to conduct
intimate relationships in the intimacy of his or her own home-eems to
me to be the heart of the Constitution's protection of privacy. '267
What seems to be his personal view should have nothing to do with
his oath not to pretend, while sitting as a justice, that there is a repug-
nancy between state law and the fourth, ninth,26' and fourteenth
amendments.
Georgia's attorney general did not rest his case solely on moral
grounds. But Justice Blackmun rejects the state's argument that ho-
mosexual sodomy may have adverse consequences "such as spreading
communicable diseases. ' 269 With an AIDS epidemic described on the
front pages everyday, the Court wisely resisted the dissenters' argu-
ment, which injects the controversial moral philosophy of J.S. Mill
into the fourteenth amendment.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Constitution limits the power of judges who claim to have
more civilized insights than the electorate. Therefore, any defensible
theory of judicial review must assign to exotic moral philosophy a
carefully restricted function because judges, by oath or affirmation,
are pledged to support the Constitution.
Some philosophers are more relevant than others. Generally
speaking, John Locke is obviously more relevant than the critical
legal school of subversive jurisprudence. Critical legal scholars often
embellish their dialectical reasoning with slogans about social justice
265. See A. LACEY, A DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 138 (1976).
266. Id.
267. 106 S. Ct. at 2853 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
268. Justice Blackmun cites the ninth amendment, and rejects the argument that the Fram-
ers did not include homosexuals' desire for sexual gratification among the rights reserved by
the people. Blackmun knows the Framers' intent. As Chief Justice Burger demonstrated,
homosexual sodomy had been a statutory crime in England since the time of Henry VIII. Id.
at 2847 (Burger, J., concurring). Indeed, "[Tlhe common law of England, including its prohi-
bition of sodomy, became the received law of Georgia and the other Colonies." Id.
269. See Brief for Petitioner at Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986) (cited disap-
provingly by Justice Blackmun. 106 S. Ct. at 2853 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)).
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and human dignity, but they lack respect for the Anglo-American
concept of law. They attack what they perceive to be the Constitu-
tion's illogical and socially unjust imperfections. Critical legal schol-
ars advocate a radical departure from the Framers' intent-allegedly
a reified mystification that justifies class domination. Dissenting jus-
tices in Bowers v. Hardwick should be more aware that emanations
from penumbras of Marxist social theory-not the ninth or four-
teenth amendments-generate many scholarly articles that confuse
legislative moral judgments with the oppression of the ruling class.
The Founders tried to establish a foundation for freedom: They
did not intend to liberate mankind from the customs they assessed as
good and right; they were not amoral. And they intended the Consti-
tution to be understood by lawyers, judges, and informed citizens-
not just by specialists in moral philosophy, who have taken courses in
meta-linguistics. The Supreme Court should resist the entreaties of
radicals and nihilists who reject a historical objectivity of any sort,
and who view the rule of law as nothing more than a construct
designed to perpetuate an outmoded vision of justice. John Adams
was surely right when he warned his country that "a constitution is a
standard, a pillar and a bond when it is understood, approved and
beloved. But without this intelligence and attachment, it might as
well be a kite or balloon, flying in the air." 270
270. H. ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 146 (reprinted 1984) (quoting Z. HARASZTI, JOHN
ADAMS AND THE PROPHETS OF PROGRESS 221 (1952)).
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